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57 
POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND ITS ENEMIES 
G. Alan Tarr* 
INTRODUCTION 
Chief Justice Robert Utter was acutely aware of the delicate place 
occupied by judges in the American system of government. Although 
their responsibilities of office obliged them to “say what the law is”1 in 
resolving cases, even controversial cases, doing so often required them 
to address bodies of law, such as state constitutions, that were relatively 
unexplored and that might yield new principles and unexpected 
conclusions. Chief Justice Utter recognized that legal counsel could play 
an important part in assisting judges in this task, and so in advising 
attorneys how to frame state constitutional arguments, he admonished 
them to avoid a lazy reliance on federal interpretations of similar 
provisions and instead to be aware of “the historical mandates contained 
in their state bill[s] of rights.”2 Such well-framed state constitutional 
arguments, he argued, could assist justices in developing “a principled, 
independent state jurisprudence,” which was essential because “state 
courts should be judged on whether they have created a principled body 
of state law based on their own independent analysis and 
interpretation.”3 
Yet Chief Justice Utter also recognized that “the ultimate power of 
the courts comes not just from laws and the Constitution but from the 
expectation[s] of the public.”4 These public expectations included, at a 
                                                     
* Director, Center for State Constitutional Studies, and Board of Governors Professor of Political 
Science, Rutgers University-Camden. The author wishes to thank RJ Norcia for his excellent 
research assistance and Rutgers University–Camden and the James Madison Program on American 
Ideals and Institutions at Princeton University for their research support. 
1. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803). 
2. Robert F. Utter & Sanford E. Pitler, Presenting a State Constitutional Argument: Comment on 
Theory and Technique, 20 IND. L. REV. 635, 677 (1987) [hereinafter Utter & Pitler, Comment on 
Theory and Technique]; see also Robert F. Utter, Practice of Principled Decision-Making in State 
Constitutionalism: Washington’s Experience, The Emerging Issues in State Constitutional Law, 65 
TEMP. L. REV. 1153 (1992). 
3. Utter & Pitler, Comment on Theory and Technique, supra note 2, at 652, 676. 
4. George Hodak, Judges in the Culture Wars Crossfire, A.B.A. J. (Oct. 29, 2005, 9:14 AM), 
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/judges_in_the_culture_wars_crossfire 
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minimum, judicial impartiality, resulting in decisions “without 
restriction, improper influence, inducements, pressures, threats or 
interference[—]direct or indirect.”5 The people expected a judicial 
commitment to the rule of law, i.e. deciding cases based not on the 
judges’ personal views but on what the law requires. More generally, the 
people were concerned with the substance of the legal principles courts 
announced, as well as with the courts’ overall role in the political 
system. Chief Justice Utter acknowledged “the ideal of democratic 
accountability of the public servant no matter what the position of 
power” and the danger that “the more the judiciary is independent of 
popular pressures, the greater the risk of the judiciary straying from 
strongly-held popular values.”6 However, he also cautioned that public 
expectations should not interfere with the rule of law: “the more the 
judiciary is accountable to popular pressures, the greater the risk it may 
lose its role of independent protector of nonmajoritarian interests and 
rights.”7 Rather, what judicial accountability required was that “state 
judges [be] aware of the need to be sensitive to public concerns and to 
carefully explain [how the] value choices that must be made in decisions 
are chosen.”8 
Such explanations were crucial because, as Chief Justice Utter noted, 
“state courts typically are democratically accountable” in ways that 
federal courts are not.
9
 Most state judges serve limited terms of office 
rather than during good behavior, and roughly ninety percent of state 
judges stand for election at some point; therefore citizens can register 
their disapproval of judicial decisions by voting the offending judges out 
of office.
10
 In addition, most state constitutions are relatively easy to 
amend, so voters may overturn disfavored rulings by constitutional 
amendment.
11
 This of course cuts two ways. If decisions were relatively 
                                                     
[https://perma.cc/HFC2-VWGJ]. 
5. Id. 
6. Robert F. Utter, State Constitutional Law, the United States Supreme Court, and Democratic 
Accountability: Is There a Crocodile in the Bathtub, 64 WASH. L. REV. 19, 20 (1989). 
7. Id. 
8. Id. at 48. 
9. Id. at 20. 
10. On the selection and tenure of state court judges, see Book of the States 2013: Chapter 5 State 
Judicial Branch, COUNCIL ST. GOV’TS (July 1, 2013, 12:00 AM),  
http://knowledgecenter.csg.org/kc/system/files/5.7_2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/BL4A-J5GQ]. See 
generally G. ALAN TARR, WITHOUT FEAR OR FAVOR: JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND JUDICIAL 
ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE STATES (2012) [hereinafter TARR, WITHOUT FEAR OR FAVOR].  
11. See Book of the States 2013: Chapter 1: State Constitutions, COUNCIL ST. GOV’TS (July 1, 
2013, 12:00 AM), http://knowledgecenter.csg.org/kc/content/book-states-2013-chapter-1-state-
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easy to overturn, then the failure to overturn them could be viewed as 
popular approval of those rulings. Thus Chief Justice Utter pointed to the 
failure of state voters to overturn most “new judicial federalism” rulings 
as evidence of “overall support of rights beyond those required by the 
federal constitution.”12 In fact, the ready availability of mechanisms for 
overturning state court decisions may actually encourage judicial 
creativity. If democratic means exist for overturning judicial rulings and 
if judges themselves are electorally accountable, then the familiar 
arguments about the undemocratic character of judicial review and about 
the need for judicial restraint lose much of their force.
13
 
Chief Justice Utter’s comments on the place of the judiciary in the 
American system of popular government give us much to ponder. In the 
pages that follow I continue the discussion that he started by looking at 
the debate over judicial review and popular constitutionalism. More 
specifically, I explore popular constitutionalism at both the federal and 
state levels. The decision to do so is rooted in part in the simple fact of 
dual constitutionalism. The decision is also rooted in the very different 
constitutional experience at the federal and state levels. The 
distinctiveness of the federal and state constitutional experiences is 
crucial for understanding popular constitutionalism in the United 
States.
14
 
What role have the people played, and what role should they play, in 
American constitutionalism? That these questions are raised at all may 
seem odd. After all, the preambles of the United States Constitution and 
of American state constitutions confirm that “We the People” have the 
authority to establish the fundamental law under which we will live. 
These documents in turn draw upon the Declaration of Independence, 
which proclaims “the Right of the People to alter or to abolish [an 
existing government], and to institute new Government, laying its 
foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as 
to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness.”15 
                                                     
constitutions [https://perma.cc/KB2A-UL8W]. 
12. Robert F. Utter, Don’t Make a Constitutional Case of It, Unless You Must, 73 JUDICATURE 
146, 149 (1989). 
13. See Robert F. Utter, Freedom and Diversity in a Federal System: Perspectives on State 
Constitutions and the Washington Declaration of Rights, 7 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 491, 495–96 
(1984).  
14. See generally JOHN J. DINAN, THE AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITION (2009); 
G. ALAN TARR, UNDERSTANDING STATE CONSTITUTIONS (1998) [hereinafter TARR, 
UNDERSTANDING]. 
15. See, e.g., N.Y. CONST. pmbl. (“We The People of the State of New York, grateful to 
Almighty God for our Freedom, in order to secure its blessings, DO ESTABLISH THIS 
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Yet the founding documents do not conclude the matter, because more is 
involved in the constitutional enterprise than merely the creation of a 
government; and the popular role in that broader enterprise—both what 
the people have done and what they can and should do—has been 
debated throughout much of the nation’s history. Indeed, it remains 
controversial today.
16
 For even if there is a consensus on the right of the 
people to create constitutions and replace existing constitutions, this 
does not resolve how frequently the people should do so and whether 
constitutional arrangements should encourage or discourage such 
recourse to the people. Nor does it address whether the people likewise 
have or should have a monopoly on instituting less fundamental 
constitutional changes or whether other institutions can and have 
initiated such changes. Nor does it clarify what role, if any, the people 
have played and should play—either directly or through institutions 
accountable to them—in interpreting or influencing the interpretation of 
their constitutions or in protecting the fundamental law against 
misinterpretation or evasion of its mandates. Yet these are crucial 
questions for American constitutionalism, as they are in any 
constitutional regime. Moreover, the answers to these questions may 
well vary both over time and depending on whether one is looking at the 
federal Constitution or at its state counterparts. To understand the role of 
the people in American constitutionalism, it is useful to begin with the 
current debate over popular constitutionalism. 
I. POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM 
James Madison observed of the United States Constitution that “[a]s 
the instrument came from [the Convention] it . . . was nothing more than 
the draught of a plan, nothing but a dead letter, until life and validity 
                                                     
CONSTITUTION.”). Similar language is found in the preambles of all state constitutions, and 
some—for example, the preamble to the Massachusetts Constitution—further specify that “the 
people have a right to alter the government” when it fails to serve the purposes for which it was 
created. MASS. CONST. pmbl. Several early state constitutions included portions of the Declaration 
of Independence in their lengthy preambles. 
16. The most influential discussion—and endorsement—of popular constitutionalism is LARRY 
D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 
(2004) [hereinafter KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES]. Other volumes sympathetic to popular 
constitutionalism and/or a reduced role for the judiciary in the constitutional realm include CASS R. 
SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT (1999); MARK V. 
TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999) [hereinafter TUSHNET, 
TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY]; JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT (1999). For a 
magisterial account of the popular role in American constitutionalism during the antebellum era, see 
CHRISTIAN G. FRITZ, AMERICAN SOVEREIGNS: THE PEOPLE AND AMERICA’S CONSTITUTIONAL 
TRADITION BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR (2008) [hereinafter FRITZ, AMERICAN SOVEREIGNS]. 
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were breathed into it by the voice of the people, speaking through the 
several State Conventions.”17 Few would quarrel with that. But 
proponents of popular constitutionalism maintain that the people are not 
merely constitutional legislators for a day. Even after a constitution’s 
adoption, the people exercise active and ongoing control over its 
revision, interpretation, and implementation—they are both the supreme 
creators and the supreme expositors of constitutions.
18
 This is, for 
popular constitutionalists, simultaneously a proposition in political 
theory, a description of American political practice, and a normative 
claim. It is also highly controversial, with skeptics challenging whether 
popular constitutionalism was dominant at the American founding, 
whether it has continued throughout American constitutional history or 
has been replaced by judicial supremacy in the interpretation and 
implementation of American constitutions, whether popular 
constitutionalism remains viable today, and whether, even if it is viable, 
it is desirable. After all, as L.A. Powe has observed: “The fact that 
Americans used certain institutions and procedures before the Civil War 
is hardly an argument for using them today.”19 
The preeminent contemporary exposition of popular constitutionalism 
is Larry Kramer’s The People Themselves. According to Kramer, prior 
to the Revolution, Americans “took for granted the people’s 
responsibility not only for making, but also for interpreting and 
enforcing their constitutions—a background norm so widely shared and 
deeply ingrained that specific expression in the constitution was 
unnecessary.”20 Likewise well-established was the repertoire of 
mechanisms by which such unmediated popular intervention could 
occur. These included voting, petitioning public officials, public 
denunciation of unconstitutional acts in speeches and pamphlets, and 
various forms of quasi-legal or illegal direct action. Sometimes this 
                                                     
17. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES, supra note 16, at 78 (second alteration in original) 
(quoting James Madison, Speech on the Jay Treaty in the Fourth Congress (April 6, 1796), in 6 THE 
WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 263 (Galliard Hunt ed., 1906)). Several other delegates to the 
Philadelphia Convention likewise stressed that popular ratification was crucial. For pertinent 
quotations, see FRITZ, AMERICAN SOVEREIGNS, supra note 16, at 139. 
18. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES, supra note 16, at 52–53. Kramer’s claim, like much of 
his theory, harkens back to Jean-Jacques Rousseau, who wrote in The Social Contract: “The people 
of England regards itself as free; but it is grossly mistaken; it is free only during the election of the 
members of parliament. As soon as they are elected, slavery overtakes it; and it is nothing.” JEAN 
JACQUES ROUSEAU, 3 THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 83 (1762). 
19. L.A. Powe, Jr., Are “the People” Missing in Action (and Should Anyone Care)?: The People 
Themselves: Popular Constitutionalism and Judicial Review, 83 TEX. L. REV. 855, 894–95 (2005). 
20. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES, supra note 16, at 53. 
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direct action took the form of a refusal of the posse comitatus to 
apprehend violators of unconstitutional laws, a refusal of grand juries to 
indict the violators, and a refusal of petit juries to convict them through 
jury nullification.
21
 But, in the years preceding the Revolution, it 
increasingly included “mobbing” and other forms of resistance by “the 
crowd” against authority. As Gordon Wood observes: “Beginning with 
the revolutionary movement (but with roots deep in American history), 
the American people came to rely more and more on their ability to 
organize themselves and to act ‘out of doors,’ whether as ‘mobs,’ as 
political clubs, or as conventions.”22 Yet whatever the means employed, 
the underlying assumption was that the people had the central 
responsibility for safeguarding the Constitution against its violation by 
governmental officials. 
Formal opportunities for popular participation in constitutional affairs 
multiplied after independence with the establishment of governments 
responsive to the people and with the adoption of written constitutions 
that provided for constitutional change by the people. Early state 
constitutions, for example, institutionalized the people’s constitutional 
role through devices such as the extension of the right to vote, the power 
to instruct representatives, rotation in office, and procedures for 
constitutional amendment. In some constitutions, such as Maryland’s in 
1776, the right to change the government was couched in language that 
seemed to countenance a constitutional right to revolution: 
Whenever the ends of government are perverted, and public 
liberty manifestly endangered, and all other means of redress are 
ineffectual, the people may, and of right ought, to reform the old 
or establish a new government. The doctrine of non-resistance, 
against arbitrary power or oppression, is absurd, slavish, and 
destructive of the good and happiness of mankind.
23
 
The shift to republican government, by making it easier for the people to 
enforce accountability and influence the choices of officials, made it less 
necessary to resort to extra-legal means to ensure that the public voice 
was heard and heeded. It also subtly changed the people’s relation to 
their constitutions. Whereas the people before 1776 could defend the 
customary constitution against violation, after 1776 they could in 
                                                     
21. For a thorough discussion of the development of these techniques and their use prior to 1776, 
see GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at 319–28 (1969).  
22. Id. at 319.  
23. M.D. CONST. of 1776 art. IV. A writer in the late nineteenth century counted twenty states 
with similar constitutional guarantees of the right to abolish the existing government. See JAMES 
ALEXANDER JAMESON, A TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS 237 (1972). 
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addition change the written fundamental law through constitutional 
amendment and revision, becoming “an agent capable of ongoing, 
collective self-government and, when necessary, radical constitutional 
reform.”24 But what did not change, Kramer insists, were the means 
available to the people for making effective their constitutional views.
25
 
Some High Federalists
26
 may have contended that the creation of 
institutions answerable to the people delegitimized unmediated popular 
constitutionalism. Benjamin Rush, for example, argued that 
[i]t is often said that “the sovereign and all other power is seated 
in the people.” This idea is unhappily expressed. It should be—
‘all power is derived from the people.’ They possess it only on 
the days of their elections. After that, it is the property of their 
rulers, nor can they exercise it or resume it, unless it is abused.
27
 
But this was a minority sentiment. The creation of republican 
governments may have established channels for the operation of popular 
constitutionalism, but according to some popular constitutionalists these 
served to supplement, not displace, other forms of popular action.
28
 
Thus, amendment provisions might provide “an easier, more orderly 
mechanism for changing” constitutions, thereby reducing how frequently 
unmediated popular action might be needed, but they did not foreclose 
such action.
29
 Popular constitutionalists contend that the sovereign 
people understood that they retained the authority to act directly to 
ensure constitutional fidelity and to resolve constitutional disputes.
30
 
This aspect of popular constitutionalist thought deserves particular 
emphasis. Popular constitutionalists contend that the use of direct action, 
even against a popularly elected government, is not necessarily 
revolutionary or extra-constitutional. The people can legitimately act 
outside the rules that they themselves have established. They may have 
invested governing authority in their agents, but they did not thereby 
cede ultimate authority over the Constitution nor give up their power and 
responsibility to maintain and defend it against unconstitutional actions 
by those in government. Nor did they agree to use only government-
sanctioned procedures in mounting the defense. Illustrative of popular 
                                                     
24. JASON FRANK, CONSTITUENT MOMENTS: ENACTING THE PEOPLE IN POSTREVOLUTIONARY 
AMERICA 10 (2010) [hereinafter FRANK, CONSTITUENT MOVEMENTS]. 
25. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES, supra note 16, at 110–18. 
26. For a description of the High Federalist argument, see id. at 128–35. 
27. Id. at 128–29 (emphasis in original). 
28. Id. at 52–53. 
29. Id. at 53. 
30. Id. at 110–18. 
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constitutionalism’s understanding of the continuing role of the people 
“out of doors” even after the adoption of written constitutions are the 
vignettes with which Kramer approvingly opens The People 
Themselves.
31
 In the first, a jury exercises its power of nullification to 
acquit a defendant who had made a constitutional argument, even though 
the judges instructed the jury that his argument was legally frivolous.
32
 
In the second, a crowd hooted down Alexander Hamilton and other 
Federalist speakers defending the Jay Treaty, after they had argued that 
the treaty’s constitutionality was a matter to be resolved by the President 
and the Senate rather than by the people.
33
 In the third, he describes a 
series of public meetings denouncing the Alien and Sedition Acts as 
unconstitutional, with militia companies indicating that they would not 
enforce such laws.
34
 What unites these events, at least in Kramer’s mind, 
is a popular rejection of the proposition that government officials—
whether the President, the Senate, or judges—have ultimate authority 
over the meaning of the Constitution and a popular assertiveness in 
proposing their own interpretations of the Constitution and acting upon 
them.
35
 Yet these popular actions were not meant to overthrow 
government. Rather the people were voicing their constitutional 
complaints and rising up against official authority as a prelude to—or an 
impetus toward—institutional efforts to redress popular concerns. In 
fact, even popular actions that scared mightily many of the founding 
generation, such as Shays’ Rebellion and the Whisky Rebellion, can on 
close inspection be understood as involving popular constitutionalism.
36
 
                                                     
31. Id. at 3–5. A skeptical reader might question whether the twelve jurors or the crowd that 
booed Hamilton or those denouncing the Alien and Sedition Acts are really “the people” or can 
even claim to represent them. After all, the Jay Treaty and the Alien and Sedition Acts had 
supporters as well as opponents—indeed, several state legislatures rejected Virginia’s call that they 
condemn the Alien and Sedition Acts. In such circumstances, how does one identify what the 
popular understanding is on a constitutional question? Kramer himself does not adequately answer 
that question. For a fuller attempt to grapple with how to identify when the people are acting, see 
FRANK, CONSTITUENT MOVEMENTS, supra note 24, at 67–101.  
32. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES, supra note 16, at 3.  
33. Id. at 4.  
34. Id. at 4–5. 
35. Id. at 6.  
36. Christian Fritz argues persuasively that separatist movements within the states in the 1780s, 
the Whiskey Rebellion, and Shays’ Rebellion can all be understood as involving popular 
constitutionalism. See FRITZ, AMERICAN SOVEREIGNS, supra note 16, at 1–80. Regarding Shays’ 
Rebellion, he notes:  
For Regulators, court closings did not overthrow the Massachusetts government but 
legitimately interposed the authority of the people—as the ruler—to temporarily suspend 
policies that were inherently wrong if not unconstitutional. They sought a moratorium during 
which the legislature could finally grant needed relief. Such dramatic intervention would alert 
the legislature—which was not the sovereign—to the discontents of the people that could be 
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Kramer traces the operation of popular constitutionalism throughout 
American history, but his emphasis is on the founding and the 
antebellum era, given his concern to disprove that judicial supremacy is 
constitutionally inevitable and that it has been largely unchallenged from 
the very outset. He shows that figures as diverse as Thomas Jefferson, 
James Madison, James Wilson, and John Randolph all endorsed popular 
constitutionalism in the decades following independence, and he 
documents how political practice coincided with these 
pronouncements.
37
 Even as judicial review gained acceptance, its 
exercise prompted popular threats to judicial independence and officially 
sanctioned defiance of judicial decrees.
38
 During the first half of the 
nineteenth century, the rise of political parties created new vehicles by 
which the people could influence constitutional interpretation and 
implementation, and Kramer acknowledges that the rise of party politics 
in effect “swallowed up” popular politics, encouraging greater reliance 
on the newly established forms for popular participation and less on 
unmediated popular action.
39
 Thus the impetus for constitutional defense 
and constitutional change would typically move from the people, from 
the political grassroots, to the party leadership and then to those holding 
political office. Insofar as the people had more opportunities to act 
through political institutions, this tended to efface—or at least narrow—
the distinction between popular constitutionalism and departmentalism. 
Kramer characterizes the years between Reconstruction and the New 
Deal as “a period of judicial expansion . . . [but] also a kind of golden 
age for popular constitutionalism: a time rife with popular movements 
mobilizing support for change by invoking constitutional arguments and 
traditions that neither depended upon nor recognized—and often 
denied—imperial judicial authority.”40 Populists and Progressives 
proposed a variety of measures designed to check what they perceived as 
judicial domination of the political process on behalf of entrenched 
interests. These included the requirement of extraordinary majorities on 
courts to strike down laws, the recall of judges, and the recall of judicial 
decisions.
41
 None of these proposals were endorsed nationally, but this 
                                                     
redressed before the people—as the sovereign—took matters into their own hands. 
Id. at 101.  
37. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES, supra note 16, at 48–49. 
38. TARR, WITHOUT FEAR OR FAVOR, supra note 10, at 8–67. 
39. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES, supra note 16, at 168, 192–96.  
40. Id. at 215. 
41. TARR, WITHOUT FEAR OR FAVOR, supra note 10, at 58–63. 
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did not prevent some states from adopting them.
42
 The rather limited 
success of these proposals led Chief Justice Taft in 1923 to dismiss “the 
so-called radicals [as] vastly more noisy than they are important.”43 But 
Taft was only partially correct. The political reformers’ “advocacy of 
various quixotic proposals to curtail judicial power often was intended 
merely to dramatize their grievances and remind the courts that an angry 
public possessed the means of curbing judicial power.”44 Once the 
rulings of the courts shifted, once they ceased invalidating social and 
labor legislation, the reformers lost interest in the very reforms they had 
championed.
45
 This underscores the political character of the conflict 
over popular constitutionalism and judicial supremacy. Those opposing 
the courts’ rulings are typically concerned about the substance of those 
rulings, what they see as judicial misinterpretations of the fundamental 
law, not the fact that the rulings emanated from the judiciary. Once the 
judicial obstacle to the action they favor has been removed, they no 
longer have any quarrel with the courts. 
The New Deal precipitated a direct clash between President Franklin 
Roosevelt and a United States Supreme Court that adamantly opposed 
the expansion of national power that Roosevelt sought in order to deal 
with the Great Depression. Despite the strong personal mandate 
Roosevelt received in the 1936 presidential election, his proposal to 
reconstitute the United States Supreme Court aroused fierce opposition 
not only from Republicans but from many Democrats as well.
46
 
Proponents of popular constitutionalism have tended to view the 
outcome of the Court battle as a victory: The Supreme Court had been 
humbled, its constitutional rulings had changed, and a series of judicial 
retirements and Roosevelt appointees ensured a Court that shared the 
President’s—and the people’s—constitutional perspective.47 But 
opponents of popular constitutionalism can celebrate the outcome as 
well. An institutional challenge to the judiciary had been defeated, and 
the Supreme Court’s authority to strike down laws had survived the 
                                                     
42. Id. at 56. 
43. KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY: THE 
PRESIDENCY, THE SUPREME COURT, AND CONSTITUTIONAL LEADERSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY 264 
(2009) [hereinafter WHITTINGTON, POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY]. 
44. WILLIAM G. ROSS, A MUTED FURY: POPULISTS, PROGRESSIVES, AND LABOR UNIONS 
CONFRONT THE COURTS, 1890–1937, at 20–21 (2014). 
45. Id. 
46. See JEFF SHESHOL, SUPREME POWER: FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT VS. THE SUPREME COURT (1st 
ed. 2010).  
47. See, e.g., KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES, supra note 16, at 168, 219–20. 
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conflict, even if it would—at least for a while—no longer give serious 
scrutiny to economic regulations. As the jurisprudence of the Warren 
and Burger Courts showed, this left considerable opportunity for judicial 
activism in dealing with rights questions. Although some of the justices’ 
rulings were unpopular in the states, their activism was largely 
unchallenged by the President and Congress because the Court was for 
the most part serving as a faithful member of the dominant Democratic 
coalition.
48
 
Yet according to Kramer, the New Deal and the Carolene Products
49
 
settlement, under which courts subjected laws affecting individual rights 
to strict scrutiny but gave laws affecting congressional power and the 
structure of government a less exacting examination, ultimately led to 
judicial supremacy and a juricentric constitutionalism.
50
 The Supreme 
Court carved out an ambitious role for itself as the constitutional 
expositor in rights cases, a position vigorously supported by opinion 
leaders and the legal profession, and the people and their representatives 
largely acquiesced in the transfer of interpretive authority to the 
judiciary.
51
 Once this occurred, it eroded support for judicial restraint in 
dealing with other matters, such as the scope of congressional powers 
(the Rehnquist Court’s New Federalism) or the outcome of presidential 
elections. Thus Kramer traces the origins of contemporary judicial 
activism and the accompanying rhetoric supporting judicial supremacy 
to recent developments rather than to something intrinsic to the 
Constitution itself.
52
 
Having provided a historical account of popular constitutionalism, 
Kramer returns to advocacy. He suggests that in the present day popular 
constitutionalism involves not revolutionary acts or constitutional 
revision but “some idea that the people retain authority in the day-to-day 
administration of fundamental law.”53 The people will play such a role, 
however, only if their understanding of what their role can be and should 
be changes. But this shift will only take place if the people have 
mechanisms through which they can act. Kramer thus concludes: 
                                                     
48. See THOMAS M. KECK, THE MOST ACTIVIST SUPREME COURT IN HISTORY: THE ROAD TO 
MODERN JUDICIAL CONSERVATISM 17–103 (2004). 
49. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938). 
50. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES, supra note 16, at 220–26. 
51. A similar development occurred in the states in the 1970s with the rediscovery of state bills of 
rights by state supreme courts, a phenomenon commonly known as the new judicial federalism. See 
TARR, UNDERSTANDING, supra note 14, at 161–70.  
52. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES, supra note 16, at 227–41. 
53. Larry D. Kramer, Popular Constitutionalism, Circa 2004, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 959, 961 n.3 
(2004).  
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If there is an agenda for constitutionalism today, its first concern 
is not substantive. It is institutional . . . . We should . . . be 
asking what kind of institutions we can construct to make 
popular constitutionalism work, because we need new ones. We 
need to start rethinking and building institutions that can make 
democratic constitutionalism possible. And we need to start 
doing so now.
54
 
II. ALTERNATIVES 
A. Judicial Review 
Some proponents of popular constitutionalism reject judicial review 
altogether as incompatible with a robust popular constitutionalism. They 
deride those who want judges to decide fundamental political issues as 
“today’s aristocrats” and view their reliance on judicial authority as 
rooted in a “deep-rooted fear of voting” and a disdain for popular rule 
that is fundamentally anti-democratic.
55
 They see this distrust of popular 
judgments on matters of political principle as particularly dominant in 
academia, but its deleterious effects have spread so widely that “already 
it is difficult for many, whether in or out of the academy, even to 
imagine any alternative.”56 Instead, “Americans [have come] to believe 
that the meaning of their Constitution is something beyond their 
compass, something that should be left to others.”57 Kramer’s point is 
not a lack of popular engagement but rather the sense, encouraged by 
legal professionals, that the Constitution is a document only legal 
professionals can understand. This development is unfortunate, popular 
constitutionalists insist, because reliance on the judiciary hardly 
guarantees that constitutional issues will be correctly resolved. Judicial 
review furthers constitutional fidelity only if judges decide on the basis 
of law rather than their own predilections and do not err in their 
interpretation of that law. Yet intra-court divisions raise questions about 
                                                     
54. Larry D. Kramer, Response, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1173, 1182 (2006) [hereinafter Kramer, 
Response].  
55.  KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES, supra note 16, at 247; TUSHNET, TAKING THE 
CONSTITUTION AWAY, supra note 16, at 177; see also Mark V. Tushnet, Popular Constitutionalism 
as Political Law, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 991 (2006).  
56. ROBERT F. NAGEL, CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURES: THE MENTALITY AND CONSEQUENCES OF 
JUDICIAL REVIEW 2 (1989). Thus, Roberto Unger observes that one of the “dirty little secrets of 
contemporary jurisprudence” is “its discomfort with democracy.” ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, 
WHAT SHOULD LEGAL ANALYSIS BECOME? 72 (1996).  
57. See Michael Serota, Popular Constitutional Interpretation, 44 CONN. L. REV. 1637, 1646 
(2012). 
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whether judges’ legal training really gives them a privileged insight into 
constitutions, and decades of research connecting judges’ votes to their 
political ideologies further undermines the claim that their rulings are 
insulated from politics.
58
 Popular constitutionalists insist that reliance on 
the people instead of on their elected executives and representatives is 
more compatible with the democratic character of the regime and just as 
likely, if not more likely, to yield correct constitutional interpretations.
59
 
Yet the claim that there is a fundamental incompatibility in principle 
between popular constitutionalism and judicial review cannot withstand 
close analysis. A key element of popular constitutionalism is that the 
people have the right to choose the constitution under which they will 
live, and this includes the right to place constraints on what they and 
their representatives can do. The government thus created may be less 
simply democratic than it could be, but that does not render it less 
legitimate. So if the people have chosen to institute judicial review—
admittedly, a contested question—then this exercise of popular 
constitutionalism is by definition compatible with popular 
constitutionalism. Any doubts on this point come from confusing who is 
choosing and the substance of what they are choosing. This, of course, 
does not prove that the American people have authorized judicial review 
or, more particularly, the form of judicial review that currently exists in 
the United States. Nor does it suggest that, if they have, they should not 
reconsider that choice. Nonetheless, this shifts the grounds of the debate 
from what historically the American people have chosen to whether their 
choice continues to be a wise one. 
Furthermore, as is perhaps often the case, at least some critics of 
judicial review seem motivated less by principled opposition than by 
their disagreement with current rulings of the Supreme Court. Mark 
Tushnet is quite candid about this; one suspects he is not alone.
60
 If this 
is true, then the current enthusiasm for popular constitutionalism may be 
merely the most recent manifestation of liberal distrust of judicial power, 
similar to what prevailed pre-1937 and remained a potent element in 
liberal thought until the rise of the Warren Court. So one may expect that 
should the orientation of the United States Supreme Court shift, some of 
the current support for popular constitutionalism would wane. 
More importantly, Alexander Hamilton’s classic defense of judicial 
review in The Federalist No. 78 suggests a way to reconcile judicial 
                                                     
58. See JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL 
MODEL REVISITED (2003). 
59. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES, supra note 16, at 249–53. 
60. See TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY, supra note 16, at 129–53.  
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review with democracy and popular constitutionalism. Hamilton argues 
that judges are obliged to follow the will of the people that is expressed 
in the Constitution rather than the will of the people’s representatives. In 
exercising judicial review, they are merely serving as an intermediary 
for the people, acting to prevent the people’s representatives from 
exceeding their constitutional authority.
61
 “Only the People can change 
the Constitution, and the judges must prevent Congress from making 
basic changes unilaterally.”62 Or, put differently, one set of the people’s 
agents is helping ensure that another set of their agents is complying 
with the limits the people have set on them. Judges, therefore, have 
exactly the same authority as do the other branches of government: 
Namely, to make constitutional judgments when constitutional issues 
come before them. The Federalist No. 78 argument thus affirms the 
authority of the people’s will enshrined in the Constitution without 
claiming that the interpretation of that will is exclusively a judicial 
prerogative. It does not deny that the people should interpret the 
Constitution or use their authority to call their agents, including judges, 
to account should they misinterpret its provisions. 
B. Judicial Supremacy 
Most contemporary proponents of popular constitutionalism frame 
their position as an alternative to judicial supremacy: The idea that the 
United States Supreme Court and its counterparts in the states are the 
final authority in matters of constitutional interpretation.
63
 According to 
advocates of judicial supremacy, the Court’s constitutional rulings are 
final not only in the sense that they resolve the particular dispute at issue 
and that there is no appeal from their rulings, but also in the sense that 
these rulings provide the authoritative interpretation of the Constitution: 
an interpretation binding on the federal government, the states, and the 
people. As Justice Joseph Story framed it in his famous Commentaries 
on the Constitution of the United States: “it is the proper function of the 
judicial department to interpret laws, and by the very terms of the 
                                                     
61. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton). 
62. 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 192 (1991). 
63. For convenience, given the fact that most authors have addressed themselves exclusively to 
the United States Supreme Court and its claims of judicial supremacy, I will concentrate my 
analysis on that Court and its authority; but the same arguments apply to state supreme courts and 
the authority of their interpretations. However, at the state level there is more opportunity—and 
willingness—to overturn judicial rulings via constitutional amendment. See generally John J. Dinan, 
Foreword: Court-Constraining Amendments and the State Constitutional Tradition, 38 RUTGERS 
L.J. 983 (2007).  
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constitution to interpret the supreme law. Its interpretation, then, 
becomes obligatory and conclusive upon all the department of the 
federal government, and upon the whole people.”64 Indeed, this judicial 
preeminence requires the elected branches “not only to obey that ruling 
but to follow its reasoning in future deliberations,” and this deference is 
required “even when other governmental officials think that the Court is 
substantively wrong about the meaning of the Constitution and in 
circumstances that are not subject to judicial review.”65 Thus political 
opposition to the Court’s rulings or its authority is interpreted as a 
challenge to the Constitution and to the judicial independence necessary 
to safeguard constitutional values. 
In recent decades the United States Supreme Court has become 
increasingly outspoken in proclaiming its supremacy as constitutional 
interpreter. Thus in Cooper v. Aaron,
66
 a unanimous Court asserted that 
“the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the 
Constitution . . . . [A]nd Art. VI of the Constitution makes [its rulings] of 
binding effect on the States.”67 In Nevada Department of Human 
Resources v. Hibbs,
68
 the Court confirmed that “it falls to this Court, not 
Congress, to define the substance of constitutional guarantees,”69 and in 
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,
70
 the 
plurality opinion depicted the Supreme Court as leading a people “who 
aspire to live according to the rule of law” and as “invested with the 
authority to decide their constitutional cases and speak before all others 
for their constitutional ideals.”71 It would not be hard, although perhaps 
tedious, to multiply the examples. 
One can of course oppose judicial supremacy without rejecting 
judicial review—indeed, the Epilogue of The People Themselves is 
                                                     
64. 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 357 (1833). 
Modern formulations are similar: “[T]he courts in general and the Supreme Court in the last analysis 
have the power to decide for the government as a whole what the Constitution means . . . .” 
RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 356 (1986). Not every Supreme Court justice has shared Justice 
Story’s exalted understanding of the Court’s authority. Thus, Justice Robert Jackson wrote in Brown 
v. Allen, “[w]e are not final because we are infallible, but we are infallible only because we are 
final.” 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953). 
65. WHITTINGTON, POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY, supra note 43, at 7; 
Walter F. Murphy, Who Shall Interpret? The Quest for the Ultimate Constitutional Interpreter, 48 
REV. POL. 406–07 (1986).  
66. 358 U.S. 1 (1958). 
67. Id. at 18.   
68. 538 U.S. 721 (2003). 
69. Id. at 728.   
70. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
71. Id. at 868.  
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entitled “Judicial Review Without Judicial Supremacy.”72 Yet, as the 
record of the United States Supreme Court and other courts over the last 
several decades reveals, the claim of judicial supremacy itself 
encourages judicial activism (and perhaps vice versa).
73
 For if it is the 
responsibility of the judiciary “to speak before all others for [the 
nation’s] constitutional ideals,”74 then it seems only appropriate that 
judges should put forth their own constitutional understanding rather 
than deferring to the constitutional understanding of the other branches 
of government. A presumption of constitutionality for congressional 
enactments or presidential actions makes no sense. Moreover, if “it falls 
to this Court, not Congress, to define the substance of constitutional 
guarantees,” then there is a temptation to embrace—or even to create—
opportunities to proclaim what the Constitution means rather than 
seeking to avoid constitutional questions. Thus judicial supremacy 
encourages judges, whether state or federal, to interpret restrictions—
such as the political question doctrine, mootness, and the requirement of 
standing to sue—narrowly, lest these restrictions prevent them from 
addressing constitutional issues. It may also lead judges to view disputes 
as raising constitutional questions, questions which they should decide, 
rather than as involving matters on which the Constitution is silent and 
which should therefore be resolved by the political process. 
Some proponents of judicial supremacy trace its origins to the 
American founding, to The Federalist No. 78 and to Marbury v. 
Madison,
75
 highlighting in particular Chief Justice John Marshall’s 
statements in Marbury that the Constitution is “the fundamental and 
paramount law of the nation” and that “[i]t is emphatically the province 
and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”76 However, 
as Justice Robert Jackson tartly notes: “The Constitution nowhere 
provides that it shall be what the judges say it is,” and in fact there is a 
“basic inconsistency between popular government and judicial 
                                                     
72. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES, supra note 16, at 249–53. 
73. See THAT EMINENT TRIBUNAL: JUDICIAL SUPREMACY AND THE CONSTITUTION (Christopher 
Wolfe ed., 2004). 
74. Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. at 868. 
75. 5 U.S. 137 (1803). 
76. Id. at 177. Legal scholars arguing that judicial supremacy was part of the original 
constitutional design include SCOTT DOUGLAS GERBER, A DISTINCT JUDICIAL POWER: THE 
ORIGINS OF AN INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY: 1606-1787 (2011); H. Jefferson Powell, Enslaved to 
Judicial Supremacy?, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1197 (1993), and Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Non-
Supreme Court, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1121 (1993). Larry Kramer rightly dismisses these claims as less 
constitutional history than “a story of judicial triumphalism.” KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES, 
supra note 16, at 229. 
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supremacy.”77 It is true that “by the late 1790s the argument that courts 
were peculiarly responsible for constitutional interpretation, that their 
words ought indeed to be final, had become part of the Federalist 
canon.”78 But this was a partisan position, put forth by a party that saw 
itself losing power in electoral politics, rather than a universally 
accepted view; and even Federalists did not consistently defend that 
position. Thus, in a letter to Samuel Chase composed a year after 
Marbury, Chief Justice Marshall himself contemplated allowing 
Congress to overturn the Court’s rulings by a two-thirds majority, fearful 
that an insistence by the United States Supreme Court on judicial 
supremacy would risk impeachment of the justices.
79
 
The spread of judicial review in the nineteenth century encouraged 
claims of judicial supremacy, especially as judicial review became 
assimilated to legal interpretation more generally.
80
 Such claims were 
most often advanced by the judges themselves and by their allies in the 
emerging legal profession.
81
 But this took time, because judicial review 
itself advanced slowly: The United States Supreme Court struck down 
                                                     
77. ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY: A STUDY OF A CRISIS IN 
AMERICAN POWER POLITICS vii, 3 (1941) [hereinafter JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL 
SUPREMACY]. Larry Kramer insists that “when our Founding Fathers wrote no one had yet 
imagined anything even remotely like modern judicial supremacy,” and Keith Whittington concurs 
that “[j]udicial supremacy did not emerge as a fully formed and politically dominant constitutional 
theory at the time of the Founding or in the early years of the nation’s history.” KRAMER, THE 
PEOPLE THEMSELVES, supra note 16, at 250; see also WHITTINGTON, POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF 
JUDICIAL SUPREMACY, supra note 43, at 10. Akhil Amar notes that claims that the Supreme Court 
was the ultimate constitutional interpreter “never appeared in the United States Reports until the 
second half of the twentieth century.” AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION: 
THE PRECEDENTS AND PRINCIPLES WE LIVE BY 237 (2012). 
78. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES, supra note 16, at 135. 
79. Marshall’s proposal came in a letter to Samuel Chase in which he wrote: “I think the modern 
doctrine of impeachment should yield to an appellate jurisdiction in the legislature. A reversal of 
those legal opinions deemed unsound by the legislature would certainly better comport with the 
mildness of our character than [would] a removal of the Judge who has rendered them unknowing 
of his fault.” JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY, supra note 77, at 28. 
80. On the changing understanding of judicial review during the late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries, see generally SYLVIA SNOWISS, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE LAW OF THE 
CONSTITUTION (1990).  
81. Thus in his Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States Justice Joseph Story 
wrote: 
[I]t is the proper function of the judicial department to interpret laws, and by 
the very terms of the constitution to interpret the supreme law.  Its 
interpretation, then, becomes obligatory and conclusive upon all the 
departments of the federal government, and upon the whole people, so far as 
their rights and duties are derived from, or affected by, that constitution. 
STORY, supra note 64, at 357. 
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only two congressional statutes prior to the Civil War, and state high 
courts likewise invalidated few statutes until the 1850s.
82
 Chief Justice 
Marshall attempted to reinvigorate the idea of judicial supremacy in 
McCulloch v. Maryland,
83
 claiming that “[o]n the Supreme Court of the 
United States has the constitution of our country devolved this important 
duty” to settle disputes over the “constitution of our country, in its most 
interesting and vital parts.”84 His ruling provoked intense controversy, 
but not because of its insistence on judicial supremacy, which was 
largely ignored.
85
 
This is not to deny that in practice a sort of pragmatic judicial 
supremacy may have operated, even if principled claims for judicial 
supremacy were rejected. Courts often made the final and determinative 
decision in constitutional disputes, operating in a zone of political 
indifference. They struck down politically inconsequential laws without 
incurring political repercussions, and some of their rulings enjoyed 
broad political support. Nonetheless, most scholars have concluded that 
until recent decades judicial claims of interpretive supremacy arose 
episodically rather than constantly, that those claims were almost always 
contentious, a matter of political dispute rather than unquestioning 
acceptance, and that particularly in the nineteenth century, both federal 
and state officials were willing to ignore rulings with which they 
disagreed or to deny their finality.
86
 
                                                     
82. The two statutes invalidated by the United States Supreme Court were a section of the 
Judiciary Act of 1789, struck down in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803), and the Missouri 
Compromise of 1820, struck down in Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857). The justices were 
somewhat more active in striking down state statutes—for data, see WHITTINGTON, POLITICAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY, supra note 43, at 107. For data on judicial review in the 
states during the antebellum period, see Jed Handelsman Shugerman, Economic Crisis and the Rise 
of Judicial Elections and Judicial Review, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1061, 1115–42 (2010). The results of 
state-specific studies of judicial review during the antebellum period are summarized in TARR, 
WITHOUT FEAR OR FAVOR, supra note 10, at 26–30. 
83. 17 U.S. 316 (1819). 
84. Id. at 400–01.  
85. On the debate engendered by McCulloch, in which Marshall himself participated, see JOHN 
MARSHALL’S DEFENSE OF MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND (Gerald Gunther ed., 1969). Kramer notes 
that “[j]udicial supremacy was a small point even in the essays of Marshall and his adversaries” and 
that “[p]ublic inattentiveness to the issue was mirrored as well in the new treatises on constitutional 
law that seemed suddenly to be pouring from the presses.” KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES, 
supra note 16, at 156. 
86. On the political controversy over the development of judicial supremacy, see Mark A. Graber, 
The Problematic Establishment of Judicial Review, in THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN 
POLITICS: NEW INSTITUTIONALIST PERSPECTIVES (Cornell Clayton & Howard Gillman eds., 1999); 
James Stoner, Who Has Authority over the Constitution of the United States?, in THE SUPREME 
COURT AND THE IDEA OF CONSTITUTIONALISM (Steven Kautz et al. eds., 2009); the essays collected 
in THAT EMINENT TRIBUNAL: JUDICIAL SUPREMACY AND THE CONSTITUTION (Christopher Wolfe 
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Some proponents of judicial supremacy justify it based on its 
substantive effects rather than its historical pedigree. They argue first of 
all that judicial supremacy fills a need for the authoritative resolution of 
constitutional disputes: Indeed, the decisional finality judicial supremacy 
provides is essential for maintaining the authority of the Constitution 
and the rule of law. As Justice William Johnson put it: 
Once admit that the decisions of that tribunal which the 
Constitution has established to pronounce on the validity of 
Congressional enactments, is not to be regarded as final—is not 
to bind, definitively, the will of States, as well as of individuals, 
(and I understand you as going the full length of this,) and no 
barrier is left against mutual encroachments, mutual dissentions, 
and civil war. The very cement of the Union is gone.
87
 
More recent commentators have echoed Johnson’s sentiments. For 
example, Larry Alexander and Frederick Schauer insist that absent a 
“single authoritative interpreter,” there would be “interpretive anarchy” 
and that the law can serve its settlement function only if other 
institutions defer to the judgments of the courts.
88
 
Other judicial supremacists contend that judicial supremacy promotes 
more just, as well as more constitutionally correct, outcomes. They 
maintain that judicial review, enhanced by judicial supremacy, provides 
a valuable check on majoritarian tyranny and democratic excesses and 
that it protects the rights of minorities, citing judicial interventions on 
behalf of racial and religious minorities to bolster their case.
89
 Although 
eschewing claims of judicial infallibility, these judicial supremacists 
argue that the judges’ insulation from political influences, their training, 
and their insight into political principle enables them to better resolve 
contentious constitutional controversies. In making this argument, they 
                                                     
ed., 2004); and WHITTINGTON, POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY, supra note 43. 
87. DONALD G. MORGAN, CONGRESS AND THE CONSTITUTION: A STUDY IN RESPONSIBILITY 92 
(1966). 
88. Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation, 110 
HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1379 (1997). As Mark Tushnet observes, their argument may establish that 
there is a need for a final authoritative decision-maker but not that the Supreme Court should 
perform that function. See TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY, supra note 16, at 27–31.  
89. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, In Defense of Judicial Review: A Reply to Professor Kramer, 
92 CALIF. L. REV. 1013, 1013 (2004) (“[A]s I read Professor Kramer’s stunning new book about 
popular constitutionalism, I kept thinking about what his theory would mean for civil rights and 
civil liberties litigation. The answer is chilling. Popular constitutionalism would mean that courts 
would be far less available to protect fundamental rights. The rights of minorities would be largely 
left to the whims of the political majority with severe consequences for racial, ethnic, sexual 
orientation, and language minorities as well as criminal defendants, public benefits recipients, and 
others.”). 
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typically portray the public as lacking an understanding of or attachment 
to constitutional principles or as ready to jettison those principles in the 
heat of the moment. “Popular constitutionalism,” they argue, “flirts with 
replacing the restraints of constitutionalism with a freewheeling 
reconsideration of all constitutional boundaries at the behest of popular 
majorities.”90 Finally, proponents of judicial supremacy assert that 
judicial resolution of disputes over abortion and other contentious issues 
helps reduce divisions within the body politic and thereby contributes to 
the political health of the polity.
91
 
Unsurprisingly, popular constitutionalists dispute these claims. They 
argue that the idea that there must be a final interpretive authority for 
constitutional disputes confuses constitutional law with the dispute 
resolution that occurs in ordinary law.
92
 Constitutional rulings resolve 
disputes between the contending parties, just as non-constitutional 
rulings do, but they go much further. They establish the law that will 
govern the society, and in so doing they impinge on popular self-
government. As Abraham Lincoln put it in his First Inaugural Address: 
[T]he candid citizen must confess that if the policy of the 
Government upon vital questions affecting the whole people is 
to be irrevocably fixed by decisions of the Supreme Court, the 
instant they are made in ordinary litigation between parties in 
personal actions the people will have ceased to be their own 
rulers, having to that extent practically resigned their 
Government into the hands of that eminent tribunal.
93
 
Furthermore, popular constitutionalists deny that historically the 
judiciary has been particularly protective of rights or attentive to the just 
claims of racial or religious or political minorities. For every Brown v. 
Board of Education
94
 that can be celebrated, they note, there is a Dred 
                                                     
90. DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, JUDGMENT CALLS: PRINCIPLES AND POLITICS IN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 126 (2009). 
91. See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES (1990). 
92. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES, supra note 16, at 234–36. 
93. Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1861), 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/lincoln1.asp [https://perma.cc/7QJS-GJW9]. Yet Lincoln’s 
understanding of judicial authority was more nuanced than this frequently quoted statement seems 
to suggest. Thus in 1857, Lincoln stated: “We think [the Supreme Court’s] decisions on 
Constitutional questions, when fully settled, should control, not only the particular cases decided, 
but the general policy of the country, subject to be disturbed only by amendments of the 
Constitution as provided by that instrument itself.” BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: 
HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE 
CONSTITUTION 117 (2009) [hereinafter FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE].  
94. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
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Scott v. Sandford
95
 and a Plessy v. Ferguson;
96
 for every New York 
Times v. Sullivan,
97
 a Gitlow v. New York
98
 and a Dennis v. United 
States;
99
 and it was the political branches that took the lead in 
safeguarding the rights of workers, women, and the disabled. In addition, 
they note that many judicial supremacists favor not merely judicial 
protection of rights but—flying under the banner of non-interpretivism, a 
“moral reading of the Constitution,” or other formulations—espouse 
judicial revision, adaptation, and expansion of rights, a quite different 
proposition.
100
 
Popular constitutionalists also deny that courts are more competent to 
decide constitutional issues, insisting that it rests on a cynically 
stereotypical view of the people and their representatives and a 
romanticized view of judicial decision-making. Kramer puts the point 
starkly: “The modern Anti-Populist sensibility presumes that ordinary 
people are emotional, ignorant, fuzzy-headed, and simple-minded, in 
contrast to a thoughtful, informed, and clear-headed elite.”101 Insofar as 
the people or their representatives are uninterested in constitutional 
matters, popular constitutionalists maintain, the blame may lie with 
judicial supremacy itself, because it curtails opportunities for popular 
involvement and thereby discourages popular interest.
102
 In so arguing, 
they are consciously aligning themselves with Thomas Jefferson, who 
wrote: 
I know of no safe depository of the ultimate powers of the 
society but the people themselves; and if we think them not 
enlightened enough to exercise their control with a wholesome 
discretion, the remedy is not to take it from them but to inform 
their discretion by education. This is the true corrective of 
abuses of constitutional power.
103
 
Give the people the opportunity to make constitutional judgments, they 
                                                     
95. 60 U.S. 393 (1857). 
96. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
97. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
98. 268 U.S. 652 (1925). 
99. 341 U.S. 494 (1951). 
100. For examples of such approaches to constitutional interpretation, see RONALD DWORKIN, 
FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (1996), and MICHAEL J. 
PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS (1982). 
101. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES, supra note 16, at 242. 
102. Id. at 241–43. 
103. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William C. Jarvis (Sept. 28, 1820). For a parallel argument 
of how “judicial overhang” affects congressional interpretation and construction of the Constitution, 
see WHITTINGTON, POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY, supra note 43, at 237–39. 
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argue, and the people will be motivated by constitutional principles, 
although, as Mark Tushnet cautions, “[o]f course it is a fact that the 
people are not committed to the Constitution’s principles as the courts 
have understood them.”104 Ultimately, though, “[t]he people’s claim to 
rule . . . is most persuasively put . . . not in terms of what the people 
know but in terms of who they are. They are the subjects of the law, and 
if the law is to bind them as free men and women, they must also be its 
makers.”105 
These dueling quotations do not, of course, resolve the issue. For 
present purposes, it suffices to point out what is missing in the 
discussion of judicial supremacy. If during the eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries judicial supremacy was not widely accepted, how 
and why did that situation change? Keith Whittington’s Political 
Foundations of Judicial Supremacy masterfully traces the uneven 
advance of judicial supremacy, and I shall not attempt to summarize his 
analysis here, except to note that the judges lacked the power to impose 
judicial supremacy on a reluctant people and their representatives. As 
Whittington notes, “The American judiciary has been able to win the 
authority to independently interpret the Constitution because recognizing 
such an authority has been politically beneficial to others.”106 
Politicians—and the people they represent—are thus not simply the 
victims of judicial supremacy. They have helped create it to serve their 
own ends, with some presidents among the primary supporters of 
judicial supremacy.
107
 Indeed, some popular constitutionalists 
acknowledge this. Larry Kramer observes that “[e]xcept in the most 
abstract sense, ‘We the People’ have—apparently of our own volition—
handed over control of our fundamental law over to what Martin Van 
Buren in an earlier era condemned as ‘the selfish and contracted rule of a 
judicial oligarchy.’”108 
C. Departmentalism 
In the message accompanying his veto of the bill establishing the 
Second National Bank, President Andrew Jackson provides the classic 
definition of departmentalism: 
                                                     
104. TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY, supra note 16, at 70 (emphasis in original). 
105. Michael Walzer, Philosophy and Democracy, 9 POL. THEORY 379, 383 (1981). 
106. WHITTINGTON, POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY, supra note 43, at 27. 
107. Id. at 292. For an analysis of the benefits that politicians in general and presidents in 
particular may derive from judicial supremacy, see id. at 82–229. 
108. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES, supra note 16, at 233–34 (emphasis added). 
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The opinion of the judges has no more authority over Congress 
than the opinion of Congress has over the judges, and on that 
point the President is independent of both. The authority of the 
Supreme Court must not, therefore, be permitted to control the 
Congress or the Executive when acting in their legislative 
capacities, but to have only such influence as the force of their 
reasoning may deserve.
109
 
Under this theory, then, there is no single authoritative voice in 
interpreting the Constitution, for to elevate one branch above the others 
would destroy the balance among them. Each branch of the federal 
government can reach its own conclusions on constitutional matters and 
act on them, but those conclusions do not bind the other coequal 
branches—they are obliged to accept the conclusions only if they find 
the reasoning supporting them persuasive. In particular, departmentalism 
denies the judiciary a special institutional authority to say what the 
Constitution means, rejecting the claimed “transubstantiation whereby 
the Court’s opinion of the Constitution . . . becomes very body and 
blood of the Constitution.”110 Thus for Andrew Jackson, the fact that a 
unanimous Supreme Court in McCulloch v. Maryland had upheld the 
constitutionality of the bank did not settle the question; nor did 
congressional authorization of the First Bank of the United States from 
1791–1811 and of the Second Bank of the United States from 1816 
onward. The constitutional positions taken by other branches and the 
arguments marshalled in support of them are entitled to respectful 
consideration, but that is all. If differing constitutional understandings 
develop, they might be resolved by dialogue between the branches or, 
ultimately, by the people, who directly or indirectly select the officials 
who serve in those branches. 
It should be noted that departmentalism only pertains to the 
distribution of interpretive authority within a single government, 
whether federal or state. Because it is focused on separation-of-powers 
concerns, it does not address who should resolve constitutional conflicts 
between nation and state. The states have throughout American history 
disputed the correctness or authority of United States Supreme Court 
rulings, and in some instances they have successfully defied federal 
mandates. This happened most often when they were able to find 
political support in Congress or the President. Andrew Jackson’s oft-
                                                     
109. Andrew Jackson, Veto Message (July 10, 1832), 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/ajveto01.asp  [https://perma.cc/S62F-DBMD]. 
110. EDWARD S. CORWIN, COURT OVER CONSTITUTION: A STUDY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW AS AN 
INSTRUMENT OF POPULAR GOVERNMENT 68 (1938). 
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reported comment—“Well, John Marshall has made his decision, now 
let him enforce it”—may be apocryphal, but the practice is not.111 
Nevertheless, the legitimacy of federal judicial review of state law is 
clear, rooted as it is in the supremacy of federal over state law, and thus 
state defiance is simply that, defiance. James Madison and Andrew 
Jackson, both of whom were departmentalists at the federal level, 
nonetheless rejected state nullification of federal constitutional 
pronouncements.
112
 Although they acknowledged that states can 
mobilize public opinion or use other forms of political action to oppose 
perceived misinterpretations of the federal Constitution, they 
nevertheless maintained that, pace John C. Calhoun, individual states 
could not nullify federal action.
113
 
Proponents of departmentalism believe that it encourages interbranch 
dialogue on constitutional questions, replacing destructive attacks on the 
judiciary by the President and Congress with constructive debate over 
the meaning of the Constitution. In making this argument, they assume 
that such virulent attacks on the judiciary arise from frustrations rooted 
in impotence: one complains loudly when, under a system of judicial 
supremacy, that is all one can do. In addition, departmentalists suggest 
that the fact that other departments may put forth competing 
constitutional arguments may serve to improve the judges’ constitutional 
rulings by requiring them to advance persuasive constitutional 
arguments in order to prevail. This more frequent interbranch dialogue 
on constitutional issues, in turn, can be expected to promote a 
heightened popular consciousness about and involvement with 
constitutional issues. Finally, departmentalists view their position as 
more democratic, in that it gives the power to make authoritative 
constitutional interpretations to branches more directly answerable to the 
people and more likely to act as the agents of the popular will.
114
 
It is this potentially popular character of departmentalism that most 
                                                     
111. HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES, PRESIDENTS, AND SENATORS: A HISTORY OF U.S. SUPREME 
COURT APPOINTMENTS FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH II 77 (5th ed. 2008). 
112. For overviews of the nullification crisis, including Jackson’s and Madison’s positions and 
roles in its resolution, see generally WILLIAM W. FREEHLING, PRELUDE TO CIVIL WAR: THE 
NULLIFICATION CONTROVERSY CRISES IN SOUTH CAROLINA (1965) and THOMAS E. WOODS, JR., 
NULLIFICATION: HOW TO RESIST FEDERAL TYRANNY (2010).  
113. See THE MIND OF THE FOUNDER: SOURCES OF POLITICAL THOUGHT OF JAMES MADISON 
417–42 (Marvin Meyers ed., 1981) (reproducing James Madison’s Notes on Nullification, 1835-
1836). 
114. My account of the advantages and disadvantages of departmentalism draws on SUSAN R. 
BURGESS, CONTEST FOR POLITICAL AUTHORITY: THE ABORTION AND WAR POWERS DEBATES 1–27 
(1992) [hereinafter BURGESS, CONTEST FOR POLITICAL AUTHORITY]. 
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troubles its critics: they fear that the legislature and the executive will 
base their interpretations on what is politically popular rather than on 
what is constitutionally required and that this lack of commitment to the 
Constitution may jeopardize rights.
115
 In addition, they point out that 
departmentalism removes a vital check on the legislature and the 
executive, allowing self-interested interpretations that undermine the 
rule of law and the interbranch distribution of power. Opponents of 
departmentalism further complain that conflicting constitutional 
understandings among the various branches promotes confusion about 
what legal standards apply and undermines the rule of law, which 
requires a final determiner of legal questions.
116
 
Several of the arguments against departmentalism resemble those 
against popular constitutionalism. This is hardly surprising, for there are 
important connections between those two views. Indeed, some 
commentators have suggested that since the people usually cannot 
directly advance their constitutional views, they must rely on the other 
branches of the federal government to do so. Even Kramer, in 
responding to his critics, seems to endorse this understanding. He notes 
that “[m]obs were fine in their context and in their time, but no one, least 
of all me, is suggesting that this is a good way to go about doing things 
today.”117 Rather, he describes his “goal” as “restor[ing] a true 
departmental system” as proposed by Madison and Jefferson.118 
Most proponents of departmentalism, however, situate their analysis 
in the context of the separation of powers, rather than popular 
constitutionalism, perhaps recognizing that there are problems viewing 
departmentalism as a form of domesticated popular constitutionalism. 
First, departmentalism places ultimate constitutional authority in the 
hands of the various branches of the government, whereas popular 
constitutionalism insists that the people have the final say over 
constitutional interpretation. As Saikrishna Prakash and John Yoo put it: 
Kramer’s popular constitutionalism is a theory about the 
external relationship between the federal government and the 
polity; the people decide the Constitution’s meaning for all three 
branches. Departmentalism is a theory about the internal 
relationship between the three branches of the federal 
government in interpreting the Constitution. Departmentalism, 
whatever its merits, cannot have grand populist pretensions, for 
                                                     
115. See, e.g., supra note 82 and accompanying text.  
116. See BURGESS, CONTEST FOR POLITICAL AUTHORITY, supra note 114, at 1–27. 
117. Kramer, Response, supra note 54, at 1175. 
118. Id. at 1180. 
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it says absolutely nothing about the people’s constitutional 
role.
119
 
Second, in advancing their constitutional interpretations the 
legislative and executive branches may be acting independently of the 
people, in order to protect their institutional prerogatives or for other 
purposes. Departmentalism in such instances involves constitutional 
activity that is not opposed to popular constitutionalism but that occurs 
outside of, or in addition to, popular constitutionalism. 
Third, the legislative and executive branches are, under this 
formulation, speaking for the people and acting as agents of the people. 
Although they may make such a claim, their faithfulness to the popular 
will cannot be presumed—the legislature and/or the executive may 
depart from the popular will to pursue corrupt or misguided policies. 
Indeed, lack of fidelity to the popular will may be consistent with 
representative government as understood by the founders—consider 
Madison’s emphasis on the “cool and deliberate sense of the 
community”120 and on the importance of a senate that could stand 
against popular whims or factions. Beyond that, a variety of institutions 
can make the claim to be speaking on behalf of the people, even as they 
express different perspectives. As Bruce Ackerman notes: “By 
multiplying perspectives, Publius deflates the claims of normal officials 
sitting either in Washington or in the states to speak for the People. Each 
official effort is just one of a number of competing representations.”121 
Fourth, when combined with the development of political parties, the 
system may lead to popular subjection to the initiatives of the branches 
of government and of the political parties that organize and dominate the 
departments. At best, then, departmentalism may be a means—but only 
one of several—by which the people can exert their influence over the 
interpretation of their constitutions. In a federal system the people may 
use one level of government to organize and transmit popular opposition 
to constitutional initiatives at another level of government. The Virginia 
and Kentucky Resolutions of the late eighteenth century are a well-
known example. And as an analysis of state constitutions will show, 
there are opportunities for unmediated popular influence on constitutions 
even in the twenty-first century. 
                                                     
119. Saikrishna Prakash & John Yoo, Against Interpretive Supremacy: The People Themselves: 
Popular Constitutionalism and Judicial Review, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1539, 1544–45 (2005).  
120. THE FEDERALIST NO. 63 (James Madison). 
121. ACKERMAN, supra note 62, at 185 (emphasis in original). 
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III. POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM: MUCH ADO ABOUT 
NOTHING? 
The debate over popular constitutionalism, like many scholarly 
debates, has been marked by hyperbolic claims and shrill denunciations. 
(My personal favorite comes from Larry Alexander and Lawrence 
Solum, who write: “The People Themselves is a book with the capacity 
to inspire dread and make the blood run cold.”122) Yet some scholars 
question what all the fuss is about. Popular constitutionalists and judicial 
supremacists may differ over who should interpret American 
constitutions, but the substantive law that results may not vary 
significantly regardless of who exercises ultimate interpretive authority. 
For even though judges proclaim judicial supremacy, judicial rulings 
tend to reflect popular constitutionalism. Thus Barry Friedman 
maintains: 
Ultimately, it is the people (and the people alone) who must 
decide what the Constitution means. Judicial review provides a 
catalyst and method for them to do so. Over time, through a 
dialogue with the justices, the Constitution comes to reflect the 
considered judgment of the American people regarding their 
most fundamental values. It frequently is the case that when 
judges rely on the Constitution to invalidate the actions of the 
other branches of government, they are enforcing the will of the 
American people.
123
 
The argument of Friedman and his compatriots is that on those issues 
on which the people are indifferent or on which they lack strong views, 
their diffuse support for the Supreme Court—or for courts in general—
leads them to accept judicial rulings as final and authoritative. Indeed, 
absent extreme rulings that adversely affect large groups of people or 
                                                     
122. Larry Alexander & Lawrence B. Solum, Popular? Constitutionalism?, 118 HARV. L. REV. 
1594, 1594 (2005) (emphasis in original) (reviewing KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES, supra 
note 16).  
123. FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE, supra note 93, at 367–68; see also JEFFREY ROSEN, 
THE MOST DEMOCRATIC BRANCH: HOW THE COURTS SERVE AMERICA xii (2006) (“[C]ourts have 
tended, over time, to reflect the will of majorities . . . .”). The analyses of Friedman and Rosen are 
built on Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National 
Policy Maker, 50 EMORY L.J. 563, 570 (reprint 2001) (1957) (“[T]he policy views dominant on the 
Court are never for long out of line with the policy views dominant among the lawmaking 
majorities of the United States.”). Subsequent research has revealed some problems with Dahl’s 
analysis. See WHITTINGTON, POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY, supra note 43; 
Jonathan D. Casper, The Supreme Court and National Policy Making, 70 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 50, 
50–63 (1976); Richard Funston, The Supreme Court and Critical Elections, 69 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 
795, 795–811 (1975). 
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challenge their beliefs, the people are more likely to accept judicial 
interpretations than to rise up and challenge them, even if they are 
constitutionally suspect. Most court rulings do not so much reflect 
popular constitutional views as operate in the absence of such views. But 
on those high-salience issues on which the people have strong views, 
Friedman insists that “constitutional doctrine tends to track public 
opinion.”124 Similarly, a standard history of the Supreme Court 
concludes: “In truth the Supreme Court has seldom, if ever, flatly and for 
very long resisted a really unmistakable wave of public sentiment.”125 Or 
as a humorist put it long ago: “[T]h[e] Supreme Co[u]rt follows th[e] 
[e]l[e]ction returns,” typically issuing constitutional rulings that fall 
within the political mainstream.
126
 Perhaps because of this, public 
opinion polls document a high level of support for the United States 
Supreme Court.
127
 Similarly, in judicial elections in the states, where the 
people can directly register their satisfaction or dissatisfaction with 
judicial rulings, incumbents are regularly returned to office.
128
 Thus, if 
one equates popular constitutionalism with popular outcomes, one could 
conclude that it is alive and well, notwithstanding the rise of judicial 
supremacy. As Larry Alexander and Lawrence Solum pointedly ask: “If 
                                                     
124. Tom Donnelly, Making Popular Constitutionalism Work, 2012 WIS. L. REV. 159, 162. 
Another major study, in addition to those in the preceding note that minimizes the importance of the 
popular constitutionalism/judicial supremacy debate is: Powe, supra note 19. 
125. ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 14 (4th ed. 2005).  
126. FINLEY PETER DUNNE, MR. DOOLEY AT HIS BEST 77 (Elmer Ellis ed., 1938). This may 
coincide with popular expectations of the political process. Consider in this regard Franklin 
Roosevelt’s description of American government as: 
a three horse team provided by the Constitution to the American people so that their field 
might be plowed . . . . Two of the horses [Congress and the executive] are pulling in unison 
today; the third is not. . . . It is the American people themselves who are in the driver’s seat. It 
is the American people themselves who want the furrow plowed. It is the American people 
themselves who expect the third horse to pull in unison with the other two. 
FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE, supra note 93, at 6. 
127. On the idea of diffuse institutional support and its importance for public views of the United 
States Supreme Court, see Gregory A. Caldeira & James L. Gibson, The Etiology of Public Support 
for the Supreme Court, 36 AM. J. POL. SCI. 635, 635–64 (1992). For analysis of data relating to 
support for the United States Supreme Court, including consideration of how it compares with 
public support for constitutional courts in other countries, see James L. Gibson et al., On the 
Legitimacy of National High Courts, 92 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 343, 343–58 (1998).  
128. On the electoral success of incumbent state judges, see CHRIS W. BONNEAU & MELINDA 
GANN HALL, IN DEFENSE OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS (2009). The success of incumbents is particularly 
marked in so-called retention elections, in which they run unopposed and voters are asked merely 
whether Judge X should be retained in office. See Larry T. Aspin, Retention Elections and Judicial 
Behavior, 77 JUDICATURE 306, 306–15 (1994); Susan B. Carbon, Judicial Retention Elections: Are 
They Serving Their Intended Purpose?, 64 JUDICATURE 210, 210–33 (1980); William K. Hall & 
Larry T. Aspin, What Twenty Years of Judicial Retention Elections Have Told Us, 70 JUDICATURE 
340, 340–47 (1987).  
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the people have, by fifty years of tacit endorsement, given the Supreme 
Court pride of place among the people’s agents, who is Kramer to 
object?”129 
The compatibility between public opinion and judicial rulings is 
hardly coincidental. In some instances it may reflect a conscious choice 
by justices to take account of public opinion in their rulings. Thus Barry 
Friedman depicts Justice Sandra Day O’Connor as “splitting the 
difference” between left and right and thereby arriving at solutions that 
aggrandized the Supreme Court while cutting off debate in the 
citizenry.
130
 Other scholars have documented the justices using their 
discretion in reviewing cases to avoid unnecessarily inflaming public 
opinion.
131
 In some instances, too, one can detect a popular feedback 
effect, with “the resolution [of crises involving popular dissatisfaction 
with judicial rulings] tend[ing] to restore a circumstance of equilibrium 
between judicial action and popular preferences.”132 Even more 
important, the U.S. Constitution creates a system of federal judicial 
selection that ensures that over time “judicial understandings of the 
Constitution are likely to be broadly convergent with political 
understandings” and no judicial interpretation can long survive the 
mobilized and protracted opposition of the people.
133
 
Put differently, Article III ensures a certain form of popular 
constitutionalism. The President appoints federal judges, and so the 
                                                     
129. Alexander & Solum, supra note 122, at 1602. Barry Friedman concurs: “For positive 
scholars, the whole debate [over popular constitutionalism] is overplayed; they believe that 
constitutional law typically reflects popular values, albeit at some ill-understood remove.” Barry 
Friedman, The Politics of Judicial Review, 84 TEX. L. REV. 257, 322 (2005). Popular 
constitutionalists deny this equivalence and, in any event, are concerned with the manner in which 
constitutional law gets made as much as with its content. 
130. FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE, supra note 93, at 365. 
131. Thus the Supreme Court avoided addressing the constitutionality of bans on interracial 
marriage in the years immediately following Brown v. Board of Education and waited for a case that 
did not provoke public outrage before extending the right to counsel to state criminal trials in 
Gideon v. Wainwright. See RALPH A. ROSSUM & G. ALAN TARR, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW 32–33 (9th ed. 2014). 
132. See John Ferejohn, Independent Judges, Dependent Judiciary: Explaining Judicial 
Independence, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 353, 384 (1999). The idea that the popular indifference toward 
most rulings does not preclude strong reactions to disapproved ones finds support in studies of voter 
scrutiny of political events more generally. Scholars have analogized voters as operating more like 
fire fighters than police officers, i.e., instead of exercising constant surveillance, they react only 
when an alarm indicates something is wrong. See PETER F. NARDULLI, POPULAR EFFICACY IN THE 
DEMOCRATIC ERA: A REEXAMINATION OF ELECTORAL ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE UNITED STATES, 
1828–2000, AT 6–10 (2007). 
133.  WHITTINGTON, POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY, supra note 43, at 87; 
Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Popular Constitutionalism, Departmentalism, and Judicial Supremacy, 
92 CALIF. L. REV. 1027, 1030 (2004).  
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appointees are likely to reflect the political and constitutional views of 
the Oval Office, albeit discounted perhaps by the necessity of obtaining 
Senate approval of his choices. Indeed, some presidential candidates 
have made the selection of judges a major theme in their campaigns, 
pledging to appoint judges who better reflect popular views, and others 
have made ideological compatibility their highest priority, painstakingly 
seeking out the views of potential nominees.
134
 Should presidents be 
perceived as having failed to ensure that their nominees hold the correct 
political and constitutional views, the presidents’ own party may revolt, 
as occurred when political conservatives forced the withdrawal of 
Harriet Miers, whom President George W. Bush had nominated for the 
Supreme Court. The result of presidents’ emphasis on the political and 
ideological compatibility of appointees, together with turnover on the 
Supreme Court, has meant that with only a short time lag, the Supreme 
Court has been allied with the popularly elected branches rather than a 
strong constraint upon them. From the President’s point of view that, 
more than theoretical arguments about judicial supremacy, is what is 
important. 
One can observe a similar dynamic in the states. In appointing justices 
to the state supreme court, either because the state has an appointive 
system or because they are filling mid-term vacancies, governors 
overwhelmingly appoint members of their own political party—more 
than ninety percent share the governor’s political affiliation. This is true 
even under the system of so-called merit selection, in which nominating 
commissions provide governors with a list of qualified candidates from 
which they must appoint—more than seventy-five percent of appointees 
are of the governor’s party.135 In systems in which justices initially reach 
the bench via election, most justices share the party affiliation of the 
governor and/or the political majority in the state legislature. This is 
particularly true in states with partisan judicial elections, because 
partisan affiliation serves as an important voting cue in low-visibility 
races.
136
 For example, as Alabama and Texas went from Democratic to 
                                                     
134. See generally LEE EPSTEIN & JEFFREY A. SEGAL, ADVICE AND CONSENT: THE POLITICS OF 
JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS (2005); MICHAEL COMISKEY, SEEKING JUSTICES: THE JUDGING OF 
SUPREME COURT NOMINEES (2004).  
135. Aman McLeod, The Party on the Bench: Partisanship, Judicial Selection Commissions, and 
State High-Court Appointments, 33 JUST. SYS. J. 262, 268, tbl.3 (2012).  
136. Thus an early study found a 0.84 correlation between the percentage of the vote received by 
the gubernatorial candidate and by the supreme court candidate of the same party. See PHILLIP L. 
DUBOIS, FROM BALLOT TO BENCH: JUDICIAL ELECTIONS AND THE QUEST FOR ACCOUNTABILITY 
74–75 (1980). Later studies have reported comparable results— see, for example, Lawrence Baum, 
Judicial Elections and Judicial Independence: The Voter’s Perspective, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 13, 26 
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Republican states in the last decades of the twentieth century, the 
partisan affiliation of their justices shifted accordingly. There may be 
some time lag in this, because elections for other offices occur more 
frequently than those for supreme court justices. But over time, if one 
party dominates state government, this tends to be reflected in the 
composition of the state bench as well, with predictable consequences 
for the substance of the courts’ rulings.137 
Although there is some truth to the idea of a judiciary conforming to 
the constitutional views of the prevailing political majority, ultimately 
this is too simple a picture. For one thing, the account rests on a 
problematic understanding of judicial decision-making. Judges are not 
simply the agents of those who elevate them to the bench, and their 
decisional independence, together with their developing understanding 
of the law, may frustrate the hopes of those who selected them. Among 
recent Supreme Court justices, Blackmun, Kennedy, O’Connor, and 
Souter might all have been judged “failures” on this basis.138 For another 
thing, this switch in constitutional direction on the bench occurs only if 
there is a political coalition that remains in power over an extended 
period of time and can appoint several justices. Yet at the national level 
at least, this has not been the case in recent years. There has been no 
dominant political coalition for more than half a century, with divided 
government the rule rather than the exception. The presidency has 
alternated between political parties since 1952, with a party only once 
(1981–1993) controlling the presidency for more than two consecutive 
terms, and most presidents have confronted a Congress controlled in 
whole or in part by the opposing party for at least part of their tenure. 
This has led to situations in which the majority in one branch of 
government or one governmental institution disagrees with the majority 
in another branch or institution, with each having a plausible claim to 
speak for the people. When those majorities differ on constitutional 
matters, as they have with abortion and same-sex marriage among other 
matters, how can one say whether or not judicial rulings are following 
public opinion? 
Even if one focuses exclusively on the presidency, recent history has 
involved an alternation of temporary political majorities, and this has 
affected judicial selection, with Democratic presidents appointing 
liberals to the Supreme Court, and Republican presidents appointing 
                                                     
(2003).  
137. See TARR, WITHOUT FEAR OR FAVOR, supra note 10, at 68–89. 
138. See SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 58. 
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conservatives. This in turn has led to sharp divisions on the Court, with 
justices seeking to steer the Court in different directions. Divided 
government has also made it difficult for the political branches to oppose 
judicial activism, because if judicial rulings are attacked by one of the 
political branches, they may find supporters in another. Whatever the 
reason, instead of aligning with and supporting the political branches, 
the Supreme Court under Chief Justices Rehnquist and Roberts has 
struck down more congressional enactments than did any preceding 
Supreme Court.
139
 
Finally, the idea that judges reflect public opinion assumes a one-way 
relationship, with the courts responding to public opinion. But in 
actuality the relationship is far more complex.
140
 In some instances, 
popular opposition to judicial rulings may induce judges to change 
course. For example, the United States Supreme Court backed away 
from earlier rulings dealing with congressional investigations of 
Communists and with busing to achieve school desegregation after the 
people’s representatives made clear their displeasure with those 
rulings.
141
 Similarly, the California Supreme Court reversed course and 
regularly upheld death sentences on appeal after three justices were 
defeated in retention elections because of rulings perceived as based on 
their personal opposition to the death penalty.
142
 Yet in other instances, 
judges may refuse to reconsider unpopular positions they have taken, 
and public opposition may eventually recede or opinion may even shift 
toward the court’s position. For example, the United States Supreme 
Court held firm on prayer in the schools and on most of its rulings 
extending the rights of defendants despite strong popular opposition, and 
                                                     
139. KECK, supra note 48. Altogether forty-two of the 176 congressional statutes struck down by 
the United States Supreme Court by 2013 were invalidated by the Rehnquist or Roberts courts. For 
a listing of congressional statutes struck down by the Supreme Court, see Congressional Research 
Service, The Constitution of the United States, CONGRESS.GOV, 
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140. For an excellent treatment of these complexities, see Michael McCann, How the Supreme 
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AMERICAN POLITICS: NEW INSTITUTIONALIST INTERPRETATIONS (Cornell Clayton & Howard 
Gillman, eds., 2007). 
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the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court did the same despite criticism 
of its ruling on same-sex marriage.
143
 In still other instances, the public 
may accept judicial rulings as authoritative even on issues on which it 
has strong opinions—consider, for example, Bush v. Gore,144 in which 
the Supreme Court decided the 2000 presidential election—perhaps 
because of popular respect for the Court as an institution or because of a 
perception that the Constitution assigns the Court the responsibility to 
decide the issue.
145
 In addition, it is no more appropriate to equate 
popular quiescence with popular approval of judicial rulings than it 
would be to claim popular support for a political regime because the 
people are not in open revolt. The people may not be aware of some 
rulings, they may be indifferent to others, they may disagree with rulings 
but find the costs of opposition greater than the costs of acquiescence, or 
they may not perceive any way to oppose the Court and enforce popular 
constitutional understandings. Yet insofar as judicial interpretation of the 
Constitution does not simply lead to constitutional rulings reflecting 
public opinion, something remains at stake in the popular 
constitutionalism vs. judicial supremacy debate. 
Finally, popular constitutionalists insist that it is not enough that the 
courts’ high-salience rulings track popular views. Aggressive judicial 
review, combined with claims of judicial supremacy, tends to discourage 
popular interest in and involvement with constitutional matters, because 
they seem to suggest that the people have no role to play on such 
matters. In this, the popular constitutionalists echo the concern of James 
Brady Thayer, who complained more than a century ago that “[t]he 
tendency of a common and easy resort to this great function [of judicial 
review], now lamentably too common, is to dwarf the political capacity 
of the people, and to deaden its sense of moral responsibility.”146 Popular 
constitutionalism is valuable, according to its advocates, because it 
                                                     
143. On the aftermath of the Supreme Court’s school prayer rulings, see STEVE K. GREEN, THE 
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144. 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
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claims of judicial supremacy have on public understandings. For a popular constitutionalist like 
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HIRSCHL, TOWARDS JURISTOCRACY: THE ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE NEW 
CONSTITUTIONALISM (2004). 
146. JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, JOHN MARSHALL 107 (1901).  
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involves citizens in the discussion and resolution of constitutional 
matters, because it encourages that “frequent recurrence to fundamental 
principles”147 without which government by “We the People” cannot 
long survive. Insofar as judicial rulings dominate constitutional 
interpretation and thus short-circuit this popular participation, something 
valuable is lost. 
CONCLUSION 
If the case of popular constitutionalism is persuasive—and I am 
inclined to think that it is—then an agenda suggests itself. This agenda is 
organized around the constitutional tasks or functions that are involved 
in the creation, maintenance, and operation of polity. These include: (1) 
the creation of the constitution; (2) the revision (replacement) of an 
existing constitution by a new constitution; (3) constitutional change that 
involves less than complete replacement, whether by constitutional 
amendment or other means; (4) the interpretation of the constitution; (5) 
the protection of the constitution against misinterpretation or evasion by 
governmental authorities; and (6) the implementation of the constitution 
in everyday political life. Thus, the first and second tasks are associated 
with the creation or re-creation of the constitutional order; the third, 
fourth, and fifth with constitutional maintenance and constitutional 
change; and the sixth (and to some extent the fourth) with making the 
constitution an effective instrument of governance. Scholars and 
political activists alike need to consider what opportunities exist for a 
robust popular constitutionalism in the performance of these tasks. Some 
scholars, such as Sanford Levinson and Steven Griffin, have already 
begun to explore these possibilities, but much more needs to be done to 
empower and energize “We the People.”148 
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